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Case Comments
Corporations: Minority Shareholder Defeats
Creation of Subsidiary
Plaintiff, owner of over one-third of the stock in a closely
held corporation, blocked an attempted charter amendment
which would have authorized an increase in the corporation's
capital stock. In order to circumvent plaintiff's opposition to
obtaining additional financing,' the corporate management created a subsidiary corporation and transferred money and prop-

erty of the parent in return for 4,000 of the subsidiary's 50,000

authorized but unissued shares. 2 The trial court set aside the

transfer and enjoined the corporation from making any subsequent transfers of this nature. The Minnesota Supreme Court
affirmed, holding that corporate transfers which are technically

permissible will not be allowed to circumscribe the legal rights of
a minority stockholder. Aiple v. Twin City Barge & Towing Co.,
274 Minn. 38, 143 N.W.2d 374 (1966).
Traditionally, in reliance on the principles of business judgment or majority control,3 courts have been reluctant to interfere in the internal affairs of corporations. Although intracorporate activity may be formally proper, courts have been willing
to exercise equity jurisdiction when necessary to protect the
rights of stockholders. 4 Whether through the acts of management or majority stockholders, equitable relief has been granted
when conduct is characterized as fraudulent, 5 abusive of discretion,6 arbitrary,7 or in bad faith.8
1. Plaintiff's opposition to the increase in capital stock was apparently the result of his interest in a competing corporation. See 274 Minn.
at 40, 143 N.W.2d at 375. However, plaintiff contended that more stock
was not needed to finance the corporation, and that any expansion should
be financed by earnings. Brief for Respondent, p. 15.
2. The transfer represented $52,569.16/$496,000.00 of the total fixed
assets of the parent corporation. The shipyard division which was transferred from parent to subsidiary represented about $400,000/$1,400,000
of the parent's estimated gross income for 1963 and $57,000/$900,000 of
its total assets. 274 Minn. at 42, 143 N.W.2d at 377.
3. O'NEAL & DERWIN, EXPULSION OR OPPRESSION OF BUSINESS AssoCATEs §§ 3.03, 8.02 (1961).
4. E.g., Green v. National Advertising & Amusement Co., 137 Minn.
65, 162 N.W. 1056 (1917).
5. See Mobile Towing & Wrecking Co. v. Hartwell, 208 Ala. 420,
95 So. 191 (1922).
6. See Jones v. Motor Sales Co., 322 Pa. 492, 185 Atl. 809 (1936).
7. Channon v. Channon Co., 218 Ill. App. 397 (1920).
8. Tefft v. Schaefer, 136 Wash. 302, 239 Pac. 837 (1925).
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Problems concerning closely-held corporations have helped
to create an increasing awareness of the need to expand the
scope of equitable relief beyond its traditional bounds. The distinctive qualities of close corporations frequently give rise to
internal disputes unique to that form of organization. 9 Despite
this uniqueness, most states still regulate close corporations under general private corporation laws, 10 and the courts of those
states limit their inquiry to that context." The present trend,
however, is to analyze the problem within the context of the
close corporation and to grant relief2 when a stockholder is
wrongfully deprived of his legal rights.
Under Minnesota Statutes section 301.37(3) (2), the Aiple
plaintiff could effectively block any amendment to the corporate charter.' 3 Finding that the transaction of the defendant
corporation placed the plaintiff in substantially the same situation as he would have been had the vetoed amendment been effective, the court, in granting relief, focused upon this legally
protected veto right.
On the premise that an increase in authorized capital stock
is a fundamental change which must be ratified by the stockholders through a charter amendment,' 4 the court rejected the
corporate management's argument that establishing the subsidiary was within its corporate powers. 15 The transaction was
9. See O'NEAL & DERWIN, op. cit. supra note 3, §§ 1.04, 2.01-.19.
10. See HENN, CORPORATIONS § 259 (1961).
11. See O'NEAL & DERWIN, op. cit. supra note 3, § 8.02.
12. Ibid.
13. Mn . STAT. § 301.37 (3) (2) (1965) provides:
(2) Except as hereinafter in this section provided, an amendment may be adopted only if it receives either:
(a) The affirmative vote of the holders of two-thirds of the
voting power of all shareholders entitled under the articles to
vote, or such larger or smaller vote, not less than a majority, as
the articles may require; or
(b) If not otherwise provided by the articles, the affirmative
vote of the holders of a majority of the voting power of all
shareholders entitled under the articles to vote and does not receive the negative vote of the holders of more than one-fourth
of the voting power of all shareholders entitled to vote.
14. Railway Co. v. Allerton, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 233 (1873); see
BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 273 (1946);
CORPORATIONS §§ 5129, 5133 (rev. vol. 1958).

11

FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF

15. The Minnesota Business Corporations Act grants corporations
the power to hold stock in other corporations, MINN. STAT. § 301.10
(1965), and to dispose of property and assets. MInN. STAT. § 301.09 (4)
(1965). The defendant's articles of incorporation similarly provided that
the corporation could transfer property and acquire stock in any corporation. 274 Minn. at 43, 143 N.W.2d at 378. However, a two-thirds vote
of the stockholders is required to authorize a transfer of "all, or sub-
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viewed instead as equivalent to an increase in the parent's capital; as such, it was a reconstruction of the corporate body1 6
rather than an ordinary business transaction. Plaintiff's rights
which were derived from section 301.37(3) were also used to
deny defendant's claim that the transfer of the assets to the
subsidiary was permissible because not a transfer of "all or sub7
stantially all" of the corporate assets.'
Conceding that the increase in capital stock may have been
beneficial to the stockholders and the corporation, the court argued that allowing such transfers in circumvention of section
301.37(3) could lead to the fragmentation of the parent into any
number of subsidiaries. The consequences of such transfers
would be to diminish the interests of the minority stockholder,
or to force him to buy into the new corporation to protect his
interests.' s Though the court recognized that its decision would
allow a minority stockholder to deny his corporation the benefits
derived from sound business judgment, it concluded that any
change in legal rights should come from the legislature.
The court's position that the subsidiary was established to
circumvent the plaintiff's statutory right to veto any recapitalistantially all," of a corporation's assets.

MINN. STAT. § 301.36 (1965).

The right of a corporation to transfer assets in exchange for stock in
another corporation is well established. Dworsky v. The Buzza Co., 215
Minn. 282, 9 N.W.2d 767 (1943); Hill v. Page & Hill Co., 198 Minn. 30,
268 N.W. 705 (1936). See generally BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS §§ 84, 88
(1946); 6A FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS §§ 2825, 2925 (rev. vol.
1950); HENN, CORPORATIONS § 185 (1961).
16. The Minnesota Business Corporation Act does not explicitly
require that a vote of the stockholders be taken when a transfer is not
in the ordinary course of business. Other states have incorporated this
phrase into their shareholder consent statutes. E.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
32, § 157.72 (1965); N.Y. STOCK CORP. LAw § 20. Since the phrase is
usually used in conjunction with the "substantial" amount of assets requirement, however, it is unnecessary to determine whether a transfer
is in the ordinary course of business unless it involves a sale of all, or
substantially all of the corporate assets.
A number of cases prior to modern corporate statutes discussed the
requirement that a sale be in the ordinary course of business, regardless

of the fact that less than all, or substantially all of the assets were sold.
E.g., Matter of Miglietta, 287 N.Y. 246, 254, 39 N.E.2d 224, 228 (1942);
Matter of Timmis, 200 N.Y. 177, 93 N.E. 522 (1910); see, Hanrahan v.
Andersen, 108 Mont. 218, 231, 90 P.2d 494, 499 (1939). These cases suggest that the transfer in Aiple was not one which required a vote of the
stockholders. See generally Note, 28 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1014 (1953); Note, 9
SYRACUSE L. REv. 269 (1958).

17. The opinion, as originally issued, stated that the statute does
not authorize such a transaction when "the transfer is not in the ordinary
course of business.. .

."

Aiple v. Twin City Barge & Towing Co., No.

176, Sup. Ct. Minn., April 22, 1966, p. 8.
18. 274 Minn. at 45, 143 N.W.2d at 379.
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zation can follow only if the transaction has the effect of recapitalization. Because a transfer of assets for stock only amounts to
an exchange of assets the transaction cannot have the concluded
consequences, and thus the court's rationale begs the question.
If the shares received in the exchange had a value at least equal
to that of the transferred assets, the monetary interest of the
stockholder was not affected. His proportionate share of the
value of the parent corporation remained stable, and he would
share ratably in any increase in that value. Thus, the stockholder would have the same voting power in the parent as he
had previously, and the immediate book value of his stock should
not be changed.
The only effect the Aiple transaction would have upon stockholders would be to diminish any direct control over the utilization of the transferred assets. In most circumstances this would
be a negligible right because stockholders are allowed a direct
vote only on certain extraordinary matters.' 9 However, in
AipZe this right had somewhat greater dimensions. Plaintiff
had enough votes to elect two of the parent's five directors, and
consequently, he could exercise more control over the business
and assets than the ordinary stockholder.20 Stockholders do
not have property rights in any specific assets of a corporation,21 however, and the success of their voting power is not
guaranteed. By itself, therefore, this control factor does not
justify the conclusion that this was an increase in the parent
corporation's capital stock.
Contrary to the court's assertion. that plaintiff's rights were
circumvented, it seems clear that they were respected. There
had been no change in the capital of the parent corporation; the
only change was in the nature of some of its assets. The facts
that plaintiff vetoed the amendment because he felt new finances were not required, and that additional financing was
19. See generally HENN, CoRPoRATioNs §§ 340-51 (1961).
20. The fact that plaintiff could elect two of five directors gave him
possible control of the board if he could persuade one of the other directors to join him in voting. The possibility of persuasion would not
necessarily be lost over the transferred division's operations if plaintiff
could persuade another director to join him when the subsidiary's shares
of stock were voted. However, some control would be lost if the subsidiary issued some of its authorized shares to the parent corporation's
control group. Under the Aiple facts, because of the unity of the majority stockholders, it can be said that the plaintiff would no longer have
any voice in the operations of the transferred division.
21. See 4 DUNNELL DIGEST § 2071 (3d ed. 1952); 1 FLETCHEa, op. Cit.
supra note 14, § 31 (rev. vol. 1963).
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achieved by creation of the subsidiary, are irrelevant to a con22
sideration of capital structure changes.
If the court's opinion is accepted at face value, its scope
could create a great deal of uncertainty in corporate law. Although creation of a subsidiary corporation generally has been
23
dealt with as being a matter of ordinary business judgment,
under the Aiple rationale creation of a subsidiary may be a
reconstruction of the parent's capital structure and, if not authorized, beyond the power of the board of directors. Furthermore, the rationale may extend to the transfer of assets in
return for controlling interest in an already existing and separate
corporation, or possibly to any exchange of assets for stock.
Such results would certainly be contrary to statutory provisions
granting corporations general powers, and would extend section
301.37 to untenable dimensions.
On the other hand, the Aiple decision can be narrowly construed on the basis of its facts. The court recognized that this
was a closely held corporation which had been suffering internal dissension for many years. Several factors indicated that
a squeeze-out of the plaintiff minority stockholder was in progress, and that creation of the subsidiary was simply another step.
The dangers to plaintiff were great: although he was a stockholder and director of the parent, his voice in the detached division would be almost nonexistent; and he could no longer block
extraordinary matters if they were effected within the subsidiary.
Furthermore, if the majority stockholders of the parent purchased stock of the subsidiary and denied this opportunity to
plaintiff,2 4 there is a chance that any injury would be compounded. Especially in the context of the close corporation, creation of a subsidiary should benefit the parent corporation and the
parent's stockholders. On this basis the recapitalization position
which the court accepted takes on an appearance of validity.
22. Obtaining additional financing would normally be an ordinary
business matter over which stockholders have no direct control.
23. E.g., Kardo Co. v. Adams, 231 Fed. 950, 964 (6th Cir. 1916);

Durham v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. of California, 47 Ariz. 280, 55
P.2d 648 (1936); Rubino v. Pressed Steel Car Co., 53 Atl. 1050 (N.J. Ch.
1903); 6A FLETCHER, op. cit. supra note 14, § 2823. The dissent is based
partially upon the idea that the acts of the corporation involved the
business judgment of the directors and should be regarded as an ordinary manner of doing business. 274 Minn. at 49, 143 N.W.2d at 380.
24. It appeared from the record that plaintiff would not have been
able to buy stock in the new corporation. The chairman of the board
of both corporations testified that while he wished to raise additional
equity capital, he did not want any of it furnished by plaintiff. Brief
for Respondent, p. 28.
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However, it would have been much easier and more desirable for
the court to use an equitable standard of fiduciary duty, rather
than to try to support its position that there had been a capital
reconstruction.
In the context of close corporations, utilization of fiduciary
standards 25 can be more meaningfully applied than can attempts
to fit the unique problems of the close corporation into general
corporation statutes. Although creation of a subsidiary changes
the complexion of the parent corporation and opens many avenues of abuse, as with all normal business decisions, there should
be a presumption of its validity. When there is a minority dissent,
such action by a close corporation should be subject to close
judicial scrutiny. If there are alternatives to a proposed plan
which would not infringe upon the rights of a minority stockholder, or if the benefit to the corporation and other stockholders outweighs his interests, equity courts should consider these
factors in determining the proper balance of fairness. 20 If such a
standard is applied, close corporation stockholders would have
greater protection against squeeze-outs and lock-ins, and in many
cases courts could grant relief before the damage becomes irreparable.
Aiple represents an unsuccessful attempt to solve a close
corporation problem by applying a general corporation statute.
Not only is its application of Minnesota Statutes section 301.37
25. Those in control of a corporation are under a fiduciary duty to
exercise corporate powers only for the ratable benefit of all the shareholders. See Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARv. L.
REv. 1049 (1931); HENN, CoRponRAoNs §§ 268, 276 (1961). See, e.g., Zahn

v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947); Note, 58 CoLuM. L.
REv. 256 (1958). Such a duty is breached if control is exercised unfairly
or in bad faith, or if those who control the corporation benefit more than,
or at the expense of, the other stockholders. Id. at 257. For a discussion
of who are the beneficiaries under the trust concept, compare Dodd, For
Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. RE.V. 1145 (1932),
with Berle, For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45
HARv. L. REV. 1365 (1932).

See also Brudney, Fiduciary Ideology in

Transactions Affecting Corporate Contrl, 65 McH. L. REv. 259 (1966);
Comment, 7 ST. Louis U.L.J. 143 (1962).
26. Compare Comment, 1959 DuxE L.J. 436, 458. The author suggests a statutory standard of fairness to be applied in minority challenges to majority action. The criteria the author suggests for such a
standard include: (1) no legitimate business reason for the action instigated by the majority; (2) the same legitimate business objective
could be attained by an alternate plan under which the minority would
be unduly prejudiced; or (3) the asserted business objective is clearly
secondary in importance to the majority's purpose of improving its position at the minority's expense. If a stockholder can show substantial
detriment, any one of the criteria would establish unfairness.
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(3) questionable, but the Aiple rationale could lead to confusion
in the field of corporate law. On the other hand, by applying a
fiduciary duty concept in cases such as Aiple, courts could establish a flexible test which would be applicable to the limitless
fact situations which are possible; and it would put close corporate fiduciaries on notice that transactions, even if beneficial
to the corporation, may be subject to judicial intervention.

Inheritance Tax: Transfer by Contractual
Will Not Taxable
Prior to separating, testator and his spouse entered into a
property settlement under which the wife was to receive less
than half their community property. In consideration for the
agreement testator was to assume responsibility for maintenance
and support of their mentally arrested daughter and to establish
in his will a trust to pay her future expenses. Accordingly, testator left the residue of his estate in trust for the benefit of his
daughter. The probate court allowed imposition of an inheritance tax upon the amount necessary for the daughter's maintenance. The California Supreme Court reversed, holding that a
bequest made pursuant to a property settlement is not subject to
an inheritance tax, provided the testator had received full consideration in money or money's worth. In re Estate of Vai, 52
Cal. Rptr. 705, 417 P.2d 161 (1966).
Contracts to devise or bequeath property frequently serve
as an alternative to an outright conveyance or a conveyance in
trust because they permit retention and control of the property
until death.1 Since inheritance tax statutes often proclaim to tax
all transfers by testamentary disposition, it is necessary to determine whether such predeath transactions are subject to an inheritance tax.
It has been held that all changes of ownership effected by
will are taxable under inheritance tax statutes. 2 Indeed, the
unequivocal terminology of most inheritance tax statutes seems
1.

SPARKS,

CONTRACTS To MAKE Wn.Ls (1956).

2. See, e.g., Annot., 157 A.L.R. 964 (1945); Annot., 7 A.L.R. 1046
(1920). This rule was stated absolutely by In re Grogan's Estate, 63
Cal. App. 536, 219 Pac. 87 (1923). The inheritance tax statute did not
explicitly exempt from taxation those transfers by will made pursuant
to a contract, and therefore the statute was construed to include all
transfers utilizing a will as a "vehicle" of conveyance. This was held to
be true regardless of the motive for the transfer or the existence of
consideration. This reasoning was expressly disapproved by the instant case.
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to require this result.3 However, the absoluteness of this rule
has been undermined by cases which place emphasis upon the
substance of a transfer rather than its form. In In re Rath's
Estate,4 property held in trust was transferred to the beneficiaries by the terms of the trustee's will. The will was deemed a
mere "conduit" rather than the "vehicle" of transfer. Extending this reasoning, the California court, in In re Belknap's Estate,5 implied an irrevocable trust from the terms of a property
settlement which gave the beneficiary a stipulated monthly payment during the testator's life, and which required the testator
to provide in his will for the purchase of a fixed sum annuity
payable to the beneficiary. Since the will was considered a "conduit" through which previously vested interests were fulfilled,6
no tax was imposed.
The court in Estate of Vai held a bequest made pursuant to
a property settlement to be exempt from inheritance taxation to
the extent of the consideration received by the testator. Diverging from precedent, it did not conclude that either an express
or implied trust was created by the contractual agreement; it
instead focused upon the fact that the property settlement
granted the beneficiary an immediate right to receive future benefits, which was subsequently enforceable against the estate.
The court impliedly equated the beneficiary with a creditor, reasoning that if a decedent provided in his will to pay a creditor in
full, that bequest would not be subject to an inheritance tax.
The court ultimately based its decision upon the fact that the
transfer was deemed to have occurred at the time the agreement
was entered, the will being merely the conduit through which
3. E.g., ILL. REv.
(1965).
4.

STAT.,

ch. 120, § 375 (1965); MINN.

10 Cal. 2d 399, 75 P.2d 509 (1938).

STAT.

§ 291.01

Testator's wife agreed to

devise certain property to testator, and he in turn was to devise the
remainder of that property to her surviving nephews. The extrinsic
agreement and wife's will considered together created a life estate in
the testator with a power to consume, end a remainder interest in the
nephews. The interest of the nephews therefore vested at the death
of testator's wife. Because the nephews took the property from one to
whom they were related, as opposed to testator who was a blood
stranger, a lower inheritance tax rate was applicable. Accord, People v.
Tombaugh, 303 Ill. 591, 136 N.E. 453 (1922).

5. 66 Cal. App. 2d 644, 152 P.2d 657 (1944).
6. In distinguishing cases such as In re Grogan's Estate, 63 Cal.
App. 536, 219 Pac. 87 (1923), the Belknap court stated: "Said decisions
had reference to a situation where the testator [by will] is disposing of
his own property, not of property held by him in trust for others, as to
which his will is a mere conduit of title." 66 Cal. App. 2d 644, 654,
152 P.2d 657, 662 (1944).
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the obligation of the testator was fulfilled.
Although prior decisions premised application of the conduit
doctrine upon the existence of a trust and a vested interest in
the trust property, 7 neither an express nor an implied trust
could have existed prior to the testator's death in the instant
case.8 Essential elements in the creation of a trust, such as
manifestation of a present intention to create a trust9 and definitely ascertainable subject matter, 0 were not present at the
time of the property settlement agreement." Thus, in holding
that the will was merely an instrumentality of transfer, the
court applied the conduit doctrine even though the premise upon
which this concept was originally based did not factually exist.
The conduit analysis may be appropriate when the terms of a
prior trust utilize a will as the means of continuing trust benefits. When there is an enforceable agreement to devise or bequeath property in a will, however, it is fallacious to argue that
the ultimate transfer is not by will. Moreover, without the existence of a trust, which may be objectively determined, the
effect of the doctrine is to eliminate a crucial element of certainty and predictability.
In analogizing the interests of the contractual beneficiary to
those of a creditor, the court stated that because no tax would
be imposed if the claim were enforced as a debt of the estate, no
tax should be paid when the debt is satisfied through the will.
7.

See In re Rath's Estate, 10 Cal. 2d 399, 75 P.2d 509 (1938); In

re Belknap's Estate, 66 Cal. App. 2d 644, 152 P.2d 657 (1944).
8. It is also doubtful whether the court in Estate of Vai found an
interest to be vested in the beneficiary. The lower court adopted the
vesting rationale, In re Vai's Estate, 47 Cal. Rptr. 227 (1965), but the
supreme court vacated the decision without explicitly noting the existence of a vested interest.
It has been held that the concept of vesting or vested interests is an
irrelevant criterion in the field of taxation. Bishop Trust Co. v. Burns,
46 Hawaii 375, 381 P.2d 687 (1963).

Further, because the term is

variable and uncertain, its use may be deceptive and confusing. The

term has often been used in an attempt to explain a decision, without
actually explaining it; that is, if an interest must be vested in order to
reach a predetermined conclusion, then it is so vested. See COnIN,
CorMATcs § 626 (1960).
9. 1 SCOTT, TausTs § 23 (2d ed. 1956); RESTATEMENT (SECOND),
TauSTS § 23 (1959).
10. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TRusTs § 76 (1959); see Matter of
Howell, 255 N.Y. 211, 174 N.E. 457 (1931).
11. The trust was not to be funded until the testator's death,
and its use was only for the beneficiary's care and maintenance subsequent to that time. Also, since the trust was to be funded with an
amount that could only be determined at the time of the testator's death,

the subject matter was neither definite nor definitely ascertainable.
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While it is true that a creditor provided for in a will who enforces his claim against the estate does not pay an inheritance
tax,'2 the existence of an enforceable right alone does not eliminate the tax. Clearly an inheritance tax would be imposed if a
creditor simply accepted a bequest in satisfaction of his claim. 13
To avoid the tax, a creditor must renounce the legacy and exert
his legal claim. 1 4 Because the beneficiary in Estate of Vai did
not renounce the legacy and enforce her legal claim, the creditor
analogy does not justify the court's decision.
Furthermore, it is necessary to distinguish between a contract creating an enforceable claim against an estate and a contract to make a will containing a specific legacy. Arguably,
the property settlement agreement in Estate of Vai constituted a
contract to leave a certain legacy to the testator's daughter.
In the case of a contract to make a will, an inheritance tax would
be imposed even if the beneficiary brings an action against the
estate to enforce his rights. 5 Certainly, if the beneficiary accepts the legacy under the contractual will, rather than bringing
an action to enforce his rights, logic dictates the imposition of
an inheritance tax.
The requirement of a consideration in money or money's
worth, however, seems justified.' 6 Exempting from taxation
12. See Koeffler's Will, 218 Wis. 560, 260 N.W. 638 (1935).
13. See, e.g., Matter of Cohen, 270 N.Y. 383, 1 N.E.2d 474 (1936);
Matter of Gould, 156 N.Y. 423, 51 N.E. 287 (1898); Matter of Sharff,
143 Misc. 447, 256 N.Y. Supp. 739 (Surf. Ct. 1932). Compare Jacob A.
Jacobs, 9 B.T.A. 636 (1927) (federal estate tax).
14. Sheppard v. Desmond, 169 S.W.2d 788 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943).
15. See, e.g., Daum v. Inheritance Tax Comm'n, 135 Kan. 210, 9
P.2d 992 (1932); Matter of Howell, 255 N.Y. 211, 174 N.E. 457 (1931);
Matter of Kidd, 188 N.Y. 274, 80 N.E. 924 (1907); Matter of Dutcher,
158 Misc. 533, 287 N.Y. Supp. 497 (Surr. Ct. 1936).
16. This requirement arguably creates an incongruity between the
Belknap rationale which was adopted by the instant court and the
court's application of that rationale. If, as in Belknap, no tax is to be
imposed because the transfer is effected by the contractual agreement,
the validity of that agreement should be determinative of the taxability
issue. Consideration sufficient to support a property settlement agreement is dictated by ordinary contract principles, and generally the
courts have found little difficulty in discovering a consideration in
these agreements. See, e.g., Jayhawk Equip. Co. v. Mentzer, 193 Kan.
505, 394 P.2d 37 (1964); Church v. Hancock, 261 N.C. 764, 136 S.E.2d 81
(1964); Farley v. Farley, 149 W. Va. 352, 141 S.E.2d 63 (1965). Therefore, the agreement could be valid and the transfer exempt from taxation, despite a relative inequality of benefits received. See RESTATEYet, und.er the rule of Vai an inherENT, CONTRAcTS § 81 (1932).
itance tax may be imposed if the consideration is not in money or
money's worth. Thus, the agreement itself may be valid and enforceable, but to the extent it lacks consideration in money or money's
worth, the Vai court would impose a tax.
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all transfers by will pursuant to an enforceable agreement, regardless of the amount or adequacy of consideration, would permit inheritance tax evasion because the value received by a
testator might not sufficiently replenish his taxable estate. However, if the money's worth requirement is satisfied, since the
taxable estate is not decreased, there is no tax evasion.
In circumventing the unequivocal terms of the inheritance
tax statute17 in order to reach the desired result, the Vai court
applied a legal fiction based on vague and indefinite concepts.
Moreover, the existence or nonexistence of an enforceable right
should not determine tax liability. The concepts of "conduit"
and "vehicle" of transfer should be disregarded, and reliance
should not be placed upon the existence of some prior equitable
property right which may be subjective and not necessarily in
conformity with the ascertainable elements of a trust.
Rather, when considering a contract to devise or bequeath, a
court should recognize that the transfer is by will, but should
exempt it from inheritance taxation if the nature and effect of
the transfer justify such an exemption.' 8 Since the purpose of
an inheritance tax is to tax beneficial succession,' 9 received by
gift or without purchase,2 0 the fact that a transfer of property
is made by a will is irrelevant, as taxability does not depend
upon form or motive. 21 If a transfer bestows a bounty or benefaction, it should be taxable; but if a contract to bequeath or
devise is supported by consideration, the transfer does not constitute beneficial succession, and it should not be taxable. Under
this approach, whether or not the decedent's promise is per17. The statute provided that:
A transfer by will or the laws of succession of this State from
a person who dies seized or possessed of the property transferred ... is a transfer subject to this part.
CAL.

REV. & TAX.

CODE §

13601.

18. "That which is material and a:-important is whether the thing
which has been done, amounts in substance to the thing which the Legislature has made taxable .... ." In re Kellogg, 123 N.J. Eq. 322, 324,
197 Atl. 263, 264 (Ch. 1938). "The measure determining the liability or
freedom from liability to the tax is the nature, the essence, the effect
of the transfer." Matter of Orvis, 223 N.Y. 1, 8, 119 N.E. 88, 89 (1918).
19.

See, e.g., Kirkwood v. Bank of America, 43 Cal. 2d 333, 273 P.2d

532 (1954); Estate of Craycroft, 191 Cal. App. 2d 436, 12 Cal.
(1961); People v. Varel, 351 Ill. 96, 184 N.E. 209 (1932).
erally 2 NossAA N, TRUST ADmINISTRATION AND TAXATION §
ed. 1952).
20. Higby v. Martin, 167 Okla. 10, 28 P.2d 1097 (1933);
Krueger's Estate, 11 Wash. 2d 329, 119 P.2d 312 (1941).
21. See Matter of Orvis, 223 N.Y. 1, 119 N.E. 88 (1918).
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formed,22 the promised property, less the monetary value of
23
consideration received, would be subject to inheritance taxation.
Generally, inheritance tax statutes which impose a tax on
inter vivos transfers intended to take effect upon the transferor's
death only tax transfers of beneficial succession. Either by the
terms of the statute2 4 or by judicial decision 25 such transfers have
been excluded if made for consideration in money or money's
worth. A common justification for this exclusion is that since
the consideration received exactly offsets the amount of the
transfer, the estate is not depleted. 26 Arguably, an additional
basis for the exclusion is to prevent a double tax upon the value
27
of the property transferred.
Similarly, when a contract to devise or bequeath property is
supported by consideration in money or money's worth, the value
of the estate remaining available for distribution to beneficiaries
other than the contractual promisee is not depleted. Furthermore, if a tax is imposed upon the property devised pursuant to
the contract, as well as upon the consideration when later distributed to the other beneficiaries, the ultimate effect would be
double taxation to the extent of this consideration. Thus, the
justifications for permitting tax exemption for certain inter vivos
transfers appear equally applicable to transfers by will pursuant
to a contract based on a money's worth consideration.
Under this approach a creditor provided for in a will would
not be placed in the dilemma of having to choose between his
22. If the promisor breaches by failing to make a conforming will,
a constructive trust could be imposed in favor of the promisee and
against those who take under the will or by intestacy. See cases
cited note 15 supra. If the promisor breaches by failing to make a will,
and if the entire estate is distributed to his heirs, they will receive in
total an amount equal to their intestate shares plus the consideration.
A constructive trust could be imposed upon that property received by
the heirs in excess of their statutory shares.
23. Cf. Commissioner v. Porter, 92 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1937). Compare INT.REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2043.
24. For example, the California statute in force at the time of
Estate of Vlai provided:
Any transfer specified in this article made during lifetime by a
resident . . . by deed, grant, bargain, sale, assignment, or gift,

without a valuable and adequate consideration, is a transfer
subject to this part.
CAL. Ray. & TAX. CODE § 13641.
25. See, e.g., Schroeder v. Zink, 4 N.J. 1, 71 A.2d 321 (1950); Matter of Orvis, 223 N.Y. 1, 119 N.E. 88 (1918); Matter of Thomas, 143
Misc. 643, 258 N.Y. Supp. 113 (Surr. Ct. 1932).
26. Schroeder v. Zink, 4 N.J. 1, 71 A.2d 321 (1950); accord, In re
Kraft, 103 N.J. Eq. 543, 143 Atl. 764 (Ch. 1928).
27. See Darr v. Kervick, 31 N.J. 476, 158 A.2d 42 (1960).

1967]

CASE COMMENTS

legacy and a suit on the debt. To the extent that the value of
his claim is ascertainable, no inheritance tax would be imposed
upon that amount, even if payment is by will. Moreover, this
approach would not be impracticable because of considerations
of administrative convenience, since present federal estate tax
law requires probate courts to make similar deductions in de2termining taxable estates.
The unequivocal terms of most statutes taxing transfers by
will do not provide an exclusion for such contractual wills.
However, some courts have refused to impose an inheritance
tax on certain transfers which, although within the classification
of the statute, are not within its intent.29 Accordingly, in the
absence of legislative action, judicial legislation may be essential
to future application of this suggested approach. Nevertheless,
because this approach implements the purposes of inheritance
taxation more simply, logically, and therefore effectively, it is
preferable to the "conduit" theory as applied by In re Estate of
Vai and its predecessors.

28. IxT. REV. CODE oF 1954, § 2043, provides that when certain
specified transfers have been made, the value of the gross estate shall
include the fair market value of the property so transferred less the
value of the consideration received therefor.
29. See Schroeder v. Zink, 4 N.J. 1, 71 A.2d 321 (1950):
It will be noted that the language used is broad enough to include such transfers made in exchange for a consideration of
equal value received by the transferor ....
[I]t is obvious that
it was not intended to tax transfers of that kind ....
So by
necessary implication such transfers have been excluded from
the operation of the statute ....
Id. at 9, 71 A.2d at 325. See cases cited note 25 supra. See generally
Annot., 157 A.L.R. 964, 979, 984 (1945).

